Cultivating Critical Sentimental Education in Human Rights Education by Zembylas, Michalinos
International Journal of Human Rights Education
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 3
2017
Cultivating Critical Sentimental Education in
Human Rights Education
Michalinos Zembylas
Open University of Cyprus & University of the Free State, m.zembylas@ouc.ac.cy
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/ijhre
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Journal of Human Rights Education by an authorized editor of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson
Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zembylas, Michalinos. (2017) . "Cultivating Critical Sentimental Education in Human Rights Education," International Journal of
Human Rights Education, 1(1) .
Retrieved from http://repository.usfca.edu/ijhre/vol1/iss1/3
	  	   1  
Cultivating  Critical  
Sentimental  Education  in    
Human  Rights  Education1  
  
Michalinos  Zembylas*  




ne  of  the  most  serious  challenges  faced  by  recent  scholarship  on  
human   rights   education   (hereafter   HRE)   is   to   conceptualize   a  
pedagogical   orientation   that   avoids  both   the  pitfalls   of   a  purely  
juridical  address  (i.e.,  the  emphasis  on  the  idea  of  human  rights  as  legal  en-­‐
titlements)  and  a  ‘cheap  sentimental’  approach  (i.e.,  the  reading  of  sad  and  
sentimental  stories  of  horrendous  suffering  which  move  us  to  pity,  patting  
ourselves  on  back,   and   then   resuming  our  ordinary   life).  The   term   ‘cheap  
sentimentality’  was  coined  by  Hannah  Arendt  (1994,  p.  251)  to  refer  to  what  
she  saw  as  misplaced  expressions  of  guilt  among  German  youth  after  World  
War  II.  ‘Empty  sentimentality’  is  a  similar  more  recent  term  which  refers  to  
a   superficial   feeling  of  empathy  and  solidarity  with   those  who  suffer   (e.g.,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  A  slightly  revised  version  of  this  paper  has  been  published  in  Educational  Philosophy  and  
Theory  (vol.  48,  issue  11,  pp.  1151-­‐1167)  under  the  title  "Toward  a  critical-­‐sentimental  orienta-­‐
tion  in  human  rights  education."  
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see  Kaplan,  2005).  What  I  am  trying  to  do  in  this  paper,  then,  is  to  call  for  a  
pedagogical   orientation   that   accepts   the   values   of   ‘sentimental   education’  
(Rorty,  1998)  in  HRE,  yet  a  form  of  sentimental  education  that  adopts  a  crit-­‐
ical   perspective   on   “the   presumed   transparency   of   suffering”   (Cvetkovich,  
2012,   p.   9).   The   central   question   driving  my   paper   is:  Which   pedagogical  
demands  would  a  critical-­‐sentimental  education  place  on  human  rights  ed-­‐
ucators   and   learners   so   that   HRE   discourages   cheap   or   empty  
sentimentality  and  instead  cultivates  action-­‐oriented  empathy?  
   To   address   this   question,   the   paper   is   structured   in   the   following  
manner.  First,  I  discuss  human  rights  and  human  rights  education,  especial-­‐
ly   in   light   of   critiques   for   a   juridical   approach;   this   part   of   the   paper  
suggests  that  as  long  as  HRE  is  guided  by  an  abstract  set  of  universal  princi-­‐
ples,   then   its   pedagogical   orientation   will   be   prone   to   the   pitfalls   of   a  
declarationist,  conservative  and  uncritical  approach.  This  sort  of  pedagogi-­‐
cal  orientation  will  also  have  consequences  in  terms  of  how  educators  and  
learners  are  engaged  sentimentally  with  stories  of  human  rights  abuses.  For  
this  purpose,  I  then  explore  HRE  as  ‘sentimental  education’,  beginning  from  
Rorty’s   (1998)   key   intervention   on   human   rights   discourse   on   the   im-­‐
portance   of   ‘sentimental   education’   in   creating   feelings   of   sympathy  
towards   those   who   suffer   from   human   rights   violations.   Rorty’s   model   is  
praised  for  some  of  its  strengths,  while  the  next  part  of  the  paper  discusses  
its  weaknesses  and  thus  enriches  his  account  with  interventions  from  other  
scholars  on  HRE  who  suggest  a  different  take  on  how  to  deal  with  the  issue  
of   sentimentality.   The   last   part   of   the   paper   re-­‐frames   the   idea   of   ‘senti-­‐
mental  education’   to   fortify   it  with   the  necessary   ‘criticality’   so   that   it  can  
diffuse  the  dangers  of  empty  sentimentality  and  move  beyond  the  pitfalls  of  
a  purely  juridical  address  of  human  rights.  
  
Human  Rights  Education  Critiques  
  
The  last  few  decades  have  witnessed  the  evolution  of  HRE  into  a  
field  that  sources  its  currency  from  a  perceived  consensus  on  the  universal-­‐
ism  of  human  rights  and  their  moral  power  (Keet,  2012).  Although  there  is  a  
range  of  perspectives  in  relation  to  HRE,  “most  scholars  and  practitioners  
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agree  that  HRE  must  include  both  content  and  process  related  to  human  
rights”  (Bajaj,  2011,  p.  482,  emphasis  in  original).  The  first  component  em-­‐
phasizes  knowledge  about  the  history  of  human  rights  and  familiarity  with  
key  documents  (e.g.  the  United  Nations  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  
Rights),  while  the  second  component  emphasizes  the  development  of  skills,  
values,  and  actions  so  that  learners  advocate  for  and  participate  in  the  
transformation  of  society  towards  greater  human  rights  protection  for  all  
(Lohrenscheit,  2002).  The  general  goal  of  all  HRE  remains  the  integration  of  
human  rights  standards  and  practices  into  people’s  daily  lives  (Tibbitts,  
2002).  
   Bajaj  (2011)  argues  that  there  are  different  ideological  orientations  
and  outcomes  of  HRE  and  identifies  the  following  three  categories  depend-­‐
ing  on  where  the  focus  is  placed:  (1)  HRE  for  global  citizenship,  which  
focuses  on  fostering  knowledge  and  skills  related  to  universal  values  and  
standards;  (2)  HRE  for  coexistence,  which  focuses  on  fostering  knowledge  
and  skills  that  promote  peaceful  coexistence  in  conflict-­‐ridden  societies;  
and  (3)  HRE  for  transformative  action,  which  encourages  learners  to  engage  
in  struggles  for  social  justice  and  change.  The  underlying  ideological  orien-­‐
tation  of  the  first  approach  is  HRE  as  new  global  political  order;  the  second  
approach  views  HRE  as  healing  and  reconciliation;  and  the  third  approach  
envisions  HRE  as  radical  politics  of  inclusion  and  social  justice.  The  bot-­‐
tom-­‐line  is  that  there  can  be  many  ways  to  or  orientations  of  HRE,  in  
accordance  with  its  educational  objectives  and  context.  
Since   the   adoption   of   the  United  Nations  Universal  Declaration   of  
Human  Rights  in  1948  after  the  atrocities  of  World  War  II,  the  idea  of  hu-­‐
man  rights  as  a  universal  set  of  standards  has  become  almost  incontestable  
(Baxi,  2007),  “elevated  to  political  correctness  where  a  denial  of  them  taints  
the   innocent   philosophical   skeptic”   (Knowles,   2003,   p.   133).  However,   the  
extent  of  human  rights  violations  all  over  the  world  has  gradually  begun  to  
cast  doubts  whether  the  rhetoric  of  human  rights  remains  simply  an  empty  
and  abstract  moral  ideology  (Keet,  2009).  Various  critiques  of  human  rights  
in  recent  years  have  raised  “the  problematic  consequences  of  the  desire  for  
universal  human  rights,”  (Hoover,  2013,  p.  935)  by  asking  questions  not  only  
about  the  philosophical  justification  of  universal  moral  rights  but  also  about  
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the   consequences   of   a   supposed   universalism   of   human   rights.   The   issue  
here  is  not  human  rights  critiques  per  se,  as  Keet  (2012)  correctly  points  out,  
but  rather  how  human  rights  have  ended  up  being  presented  through  HRE  
as   monolithic   truths   derived   at   by   a   questionable   epistemology   that   as-­‐
sumes   a   universal   conception   of   human   rights   (Al-­‐Daraweesh,   2013;   Al-­‐
Daraweesh  &  Snauwaert,  2013;  Keet,  2012;  Zembylas,  2014).  In  particular,  Al-­‐
Daraweesh  (2013)  argues  that  there  has  been  gradually  constructed  a   ‘con-­‐
ventional  approach  to  human  rights  education’  which  is  based  on  a  singular  
conceptualization  of  human  rights  as  representative  of  all  other  conceptual-­‐
izations.  
Historically,  what   is  of   interest,   is  how  we  have  ended  up  with   this  
‘conventional  approach’  (Al-­‐Daraweesh,  2013)  or  with  a  ‘declarationist’  form  
of  HRE  to  use  Keet’s  (2012)  term.  Okafor  and  Agbakwa  (2001)  analyze  three  
orthodoxies  that  proliferated  and  have  become  constitutive  of  the  broader  
human  rights  discourse  as  well  as  the  mainstream  HRE  discourse  and  prac-­‐
tice:   the   heaven-­‐hell   binary,   the   one-­‐way   traffic   paradigm,   and   the  
abolitionist   paradigm.  According   to   the   first   orthodoxy,   the  world   is   split  
into   two   types   of   societies:   the   ‘heavenly’   societies   (which   respect   human  
rights)  and  the  ‘hellish’  ones  (which  violate  them).  This  typology  constructs  
Western  societies  as  heavenly  places,  while  third  world  countries  are  “virtu-­‐
ally   constituted   by   incessant   epidemics   of   the   most   horrendous   sorts   of  
human  rights  violations”  (Okafor  &  Agbakwa,  2001,  p.  566).  The  existence  of  
the  heaven-­‐hell  binary,  according  to  Okafor  and  Agbakwa  (2001),  is  a  result  
of   grounding   human   rights   knowledge   on   the  Western   tradition.   The   se-­‐
cond  orthodoxy,  the  one-­‐way  traffic  paradigm,  is  grounded  in  the  idea  that  
current  HRE  applications  are  mainly  dependent  on  a  Western  conceptual-­‐
ization  of  human  rights.  Thus  the  focus  of  HRE  becomes  the  transmission  
of   human   rights   knowledge   from  heaven   to   hell.   Finally,   the   third   ortho-­‐
doxy,   the   abolitionist   paradigm,   “understands   a  major   task   of   the   human  
rights  movement  as  the  abolishment  of  local  cultural  practices  that  contra-­‐
vene   the  dictates   of   international   human   rights   law”   (Okafor  &   Shedrack,  
2001,  p.  584).  In  this  manner,  cultural  traditions  are  considered  as  an  obsta-­‐
cle   to  HRE.   The   abolitionist   paradigm   is   problematic   as   a   basis   for  HRE,  
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argue  Okafor  and  Shedrack,  because  it  leads  to  approaches  that  are  decon-­‐
textualized,  overly  ethnocentric  and  disrespectful.  
These  three  orthodoxies  conceptualize  human  rights  from  a  rational-­‐
ist   perspective   or   a   Western   viewpoint   and   demand   that   educators   and  
students   adopt   a   universal   or   juridical   perspective   of   human   rights   viola-­‐
tions.  Most  importantly,  these  orthodoxies  suggest  how  HRE,  as  it  currently  
practiced  around  the  world,  provides  fertile  grounds  for  a  declarationist  and  
conservative   strand   because   there   is   no   space   for   human   rights   critiques  
(Keet,   2012).   For   example,   an   important   implication   of   the   emphasis   on  
teaching   the   articles   of   human   rights   from   the   United   Nations   Universal  
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  as  universal  truths  is  that  it  leads  into  an  ap-­‐
proach   that   limits   the  pedagogical  value  of  HRE  and  most   importantly   its  
transformative   possibilities.   In   fact,   according   to   Keet   (2012),   the   ‘institu-­‐
tionalization’  of  HRE  over  the  years—namely,  the  inclusion  of  human  rights  
in  structured  and  often  highly  formalized  curricula,  textbooks  and  materi-­‐
als—has   contributed   to   the   spread   of   the   declarationist   approach.   The  
declarationist   approach   is   usually   grounded   in   a   perceived   consensus   on  
human   rights   (as)  universals   and   refrains   from   reflections  on  how  human  
rights  and  their  critiques  are  integrated  into  HRE  efforts.    
Also,  Sliwinski  (2005)  explains  that  the  preferred  curriculum  strategy  
often   follows   a   standard   formula,   beginning   from   the   basic   article   of   the  
United  Nations  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  followed  by  specif-­‐
ic   case   studies   of   oppression—usually   about   distant   places   and   different  
peoples.  The  problem  with  this  formula  is  that  it  “offers  a  largely  normative  
approach   in   which   the   steady   re-­‐articulation   of   this   curricular   strategy   is  
combined   with   a   justification   of   human   rights   education   as   a   universal  
method   for   interpreting   specific   cultural   violence”   (pp.   221-­‐222).   It   is   not  
hard   to  see,   then,  how  such  a  conceptual   framing  of  HRE  might   lead   to  a  
perception  of  human  rights  as  a  sacred  meta  narrative  discourse  (Hopgood,  
2013)—namely,  a  view  of  human  rights  as  a  revered  set  of  universal  norms.  
Needless  to  say,  not  all  scholarship  on  HRE  is  grounded  in  a  rational-­‐
ist,  Western  perspective;   as   shown   from   literature   in   the  non-­‐formal  HRE  
sector,  there  is  considerable  critical  work  taking  place  (see  Bajaj,  2011b,  2012;  
Tibbitts,  2002).  My  critique  here  is  not  addressed  to  this  valuable  work;  ra-­‐
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ther  it  builds  on  this  work  to  critique  the  conceptual  framing  of  HRE  that  is  
grounded   on   a   conventional   or   a   declarational   approach,   arguing   that   it  
needs  to  be  further  explored  and  unpacked,  if  human  rights  educators  want  
to   facilitate   the   transformative   radicality  of  HRE.   In   fact,  as   literature  car-­‐
ried  out  by  scholars  such  as  Bajaj  and  Tibbitts  suggests,  a  critical  orientation  
recognizes  that  transformation  is  an  essential  component  of  HRE  and  that  
this   transformation  cannot   take  place  with  either  a   superficial,  voyeuristic  
approach  or  a  blind  and  uncritical  acceptance  of  human  rights  as  universal  
truths.  
As  Keet  (2012)  further  argues,  if  human  rights  educators  simply  take  
for  granted  human  rights  as  universal  principles,  they  will  most  likely  fail  to  
adopt  a  critical  orientation  towards  both  human  rights  and  HRE.  In  particu-­‐
lar,   treating  human  rights  as  universal  principles  may  have   two   important  
consequences.  First,  this  orientation  may  lead  towards  a  juridical  address  of  
human  rights   in  which  human  rights   learning   is   limited  to  their  presenta-­‐
tion   as   universal   legal   entitlements   for   all   (Keet,   2009).   A   juridical  
approach,  according  to  Keet,  fails  to  capture  the  local  cultural  and  political  
complexities  of  human   rights  abuses  around   the  world  and  may   inadvert-­‐
ently   lead   learners   to   adopt   a   rationalist   perspective.   Second,   the  
conventional  or  a  declarational  approach  to  HRE  may  end  up  cultivating  a  
‘cheap  sentimental’  approach  to  human  rights,  because  even  if  students  are  
moved  from  learning  about  horrendous  human  rights  abuses,  this  learning  
does   not   necessarily   lead   to   a   more   compassionate   response   (Sliwinski,  
2005).  As  Sliwinski  points  out,   it  may  be  too  much  to  expect   from  human  
rights   educators   and   learners   to   respond  directly   to  human   rights   abuses,  
yet  the  issue  of  affect  and  sentimentality  cannot  be  ignored  because  it  inter-­‐
feres  with   learning  about  human  rights  and   their  abuse   (see  also  Abrams,  
2011;  Zembylas,  2011).  In  other  words,  the  aim  is  to  gain  a  notion  of  human  
rights  learning  that  moves  away  from  a  set  of  universal  principals  to  a  criti-­‐
cal   inquiry   of   human   rights   abuses   (Adami,   2014)   in   a   way   though   that  
touches  learners  affectively  yet  not  superficially.  
And   here   is   precisely  where   Rorty’s   (1998)   intervention,   despite   its  
narrowness,   is  valuable:   for  Rorty,   the  problem   is  not  whether  human  na-­‐
ture   or   human   rights   are   universal   or   not,   but   about  which   practices   can  
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pragmatically  alleviate  suffering  from  human  rights  abuses  and  how  to  en-­‐
gage   individuals   and   societies   so   that   relieving   pain   becomes   possible.  
Particularly  in  light  of  the  fact  that  historically  Western  human  rights  theo-­‐
ry   has   failed   to   seriously   consider   the   role   of   affect   and   sentimentality,  
Rorty’s  reiteration  of  the  idea  of  how  sympathy  for  the  other’s  suffering  can  
be  cultivated   is  an   important  contribution  that  deserves   further  attention,  
as  recent  work  shows  in  philosophical  literature  (e.g.  see  Barreto,  2006,  2011,  
2013).  Turning  to  Rorty,  then,  as  a  point  of  departure  for  my  concern  on  the  
role  of  sentimentality   in  HRE  is  not   insignificant  at  all;  on  the  contrary,   it  
constitutes   an   important   intellectual   choice   that   not   only   historicizes   the  
discussion  of  HRE  as   ‘sentimental  education’  but  also  recognizes   the  need  
for  pragmatism,  yet  one  that  avoids  the  pitfalls  of  cheap  sentimentality.  The  
next  part  of  the  essay  focuses  on  Rorty’s  intervention  on  sentimental  educa-­‐
tion  and  discusses   its   contribution   to   the   issue  of  how  best   to   respond   to  
human  rights  abuses.  
  
Human  Rights  Education  as  ‘Sentimental  Education:’    
Rorty’s  Intervention  
  
In  his  essay  “Human  Rights,  Rationality,  and  Sentimentality,”  which  
was   prepared   for   the   1993   Oxford   Amnesty   International   Lecture,   Rorty  
(1998)  argues  that  the   idea  of  universal  human  rights  should  not  be  based  
on   a  metaphysical   or   transcendental   truth   about   humanity   but   rather   on  
the  pragmatic  consequences  of  suffering  and  the  need  of  sensitivity  to  cru-­‐
elty.  In  particular,  he  suggests  that  human  rights  are  worthy  ideas  but  they  
are   instrumentally   fruitless;   therefore,   the  best,  and  probably   the  only,  ar-­‐
gument  for  human  rights  is  sentimentalism  grounded  on  a  pragmatic  basis.  
According  to  Rorty,  we  would  achieve  better  results  if  we  tried  to  influence  
(“manipulate,”  as  he  says)  people’s  feelings,  and  the  best  way  to  do  so  is  by  
telling  sentimental  stories  like  Uncle  Tom’s  Cabin.  As  he  writes:  “The  goal  of  
this   sort   of   manipulation   of   sentiment   is   to   expand   the   reference   of   the  
terms   ‘our  kind  of  people’   and   ‘people   like  us’”   (1998,  p.   176).   Such   stories  
will   create   feelings   of   sympathy  with   those  whose   rights   are   violated,   be-­‐
cause  they  will  make  the  reader  imagine  what  it  is  like  to  be  in  the  victim’s  
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position.  This  sort  of  ‘sentimental  education’  will  also  contribute  to  the  cul-­‐
tivation  of  feelings  of  solidarity  with  other  fellow  sufferers.    
   Rethinking  human  rights  discourse  from  an  educational  perspective  
raises  the  question  of  which  kind  of  paideia  ought  to  be  established  in  order  
to  contest  human  rights  violations  and  advance  an  ethics  of  sympathy  and  
solidarity   with   those   who   suffer.   Rorty   suggests   that   human   rights   viola-­‐
tions  can  be  contested  through  what  he  calls  ‘sentimental  education’—that  
is,   through  cultivating  a  sympathetic  and  affective   identification  with  oth-­‐
ers.   He   claims   that   this   sort   of   education   is   the  most   important   element  
needed  to  strengthen  human  rights.   In  fact,  he  maintains  that  to  cultivate  
sympathy  and  solidarity  as  the  primary  values  of  human  rights  culture  there  
has   to  be  a   long-­‐term  process   aimed  at   advancing   the   sentimental   educa-­‐
tion   of   individuals   and   societies.   For   Rorty,   then,   sentimental   education  
becomes  a  cultural,  historical  and  political  project  aimed  at  modifying  the  
way  individuals  feel  by  cultivating  moral  feelings  (Barreto,  2011).    
   Rorty’s   proposal   for   sentimental   education   has   two   main   conse-­‐
quences   for   human   rights   (see   Barreto,   2006,   2011).   First,   it   expands   the  
number  of  those  to  which  we  refer  as  “people  like  us”  (Rorty,  1998,  p.  176),  
by  making   us  more   familiar  with   them   and   emphasizing   the   likeness   be-­‐
tween   them  and  us;  Rorty   seems   to  believe   that  by  perceiving   similarities  
between  ourselves  and  others,  we  will  be  “less  tempted  to  think  of  those  dif-­‐
ferent”  from  ourselves  “as  only  quasi-­‐human”  (Rorty,  1998,  p.  176).  Second,  
it  offers  opportunities  for  what  he  calls  ‘sympathy,’  that  is,  to  put  ourselves  
in   the  place   of   those  who   suffer,  who   are   the   objects   of   cruelty,   and  who  
have   been   the   victims   of   human   rights   violations.   The   first   coaches   us   to  
think  of  our  identity  in  a  non-­‐exclusionary  fashion,  while  the  second  invites  
us  to  act  in  solidarity  (Barreto,  2006).  In  the  first  place,  then,  an  education  
aimed  at  ensuring  the  acquisition  of  moral  feelings  and  particularly  sympa-­‐
thy,   could   contribute   to   preventing   the   formation   of   victimizers;   in   the  
second  phase,  sympathy  could  also  contribute  to  creating  a  sense  of  solidar-­‐
ity   or   a   desire   for   eliminating   the   suffering   of   others   (Barreto,   2011).  
Importantly,  both   sympathy  and   solidarity   are  not   some  characteristics  of  
human  nature  but  rather  the  effect  of  a  process  of  sensibilization  developed  
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in  specific  historical  circumstances.  Which  particular  tools  does  Rorty  sug-­‐
gest  to  achieve  this  sensibilization  of  the  rationalist  modern  culture?  
   Rorty  suggests  that  sentimental  education  develops  the  capacity  for  
sympathy  and  solidarity  by  manipulating  our  feelings  through  sad  and  sen-­‐
timental  stories.  Reading  stories  about  people  who  have  been  the  object  of  
oppression  and  cruelty  can  lead  us  to  realize  that  they  also  suffer  like  we  do  
and  therefore  they  are  entitled  to  the  same  dignity  as  we  do.  Such  stories,  
he   claims,   “repeated   and   varied   over   the   centuries,   have   induced   us,   the  
rich,  safe,  powerful  people,   to   tolerate  and  even  to  cherish  powerless  peo-­‐
ple”   (Rorty,   1998,  p.   185).  For  Rorty,   then,  story-­‐telling  becomes  the  prime  
tool  of  the  sensibilization  of  individuals  and  culture  to  the  suffering  of  oth-­‐
ers.  His   strategy   is   to   suggest   a  widening   of   our   shared  moral   identity   so  
that   it   is  more   inclusive  of   others  who  may  be   “strangers”   (different   from  
us)  but  they  are  our  fellow  sufferers;  his  aim  is  to  create  and  strengthen  an  
ethos   of   cooperation,   respect   and   democracy   (Barreto,   2011).   Rorty   traces  
the  consequences  of  his  reflection  in  the  human  rights  arena  by  suggesting  
that  this  political  culture  cannot  be  other  than  one  in  which  individuals  and  
social  groups  are  conscious  about  the  contingency  of  the  ways  in  which  they  
are  constituted  as  well  as  the  relative  validity  of  their  beliefs  and  opinions.  A  
society  immersed  in  this  ethos  is  more  likely  to  be  open  to  learn  from  oth-­‐
ers,   to   widen   its   moral   identity,   to   accommodate   strangers,   and   to  
profoundly   reject   all   forms   of   cruelty.   This   sort   of   sentimental   education  
provides  us  an  allegedly  non-­‐foundational,  non-­‐rationalistic  version  of  mor-­‐
al  obligation  (Hayden,  1999).  
   In  many  respects  I  think  this  is  a  laudable  proposal.  Rorty  makes  two  
important  moves  that  are  in  the  right  direction  and  make  important  contri-­‐
butions  in  discussions  about  sentimental  education  in  HRE:  first,  he  rejects  
the  metaphysical  narratives  of  universalism  and  rationality  in  human  rights  
in   favor   of   an   epistemic   anti-­‐foundationalism   and   the   contingency   of   hu-­‐
man   rights;   and   second,   he   assigns   a   role   to   emotions   of   sympathy   and  
solidarity   in   the   official   discourse   of   human   rights.   Regarding   the   first  
move,  Rorty  maintains  that  knowledge  is  historical,  contextual  and  contin-­‐
gent   and   therefore   human   rights   are   born   out   of   historical   and   cultural  
circumstances.   This   implies   that   human   rights   cannot   be   grounded   in   a  
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metaphysical  theory  of  natural  law  or  a  transcendental  universality,  but  ra-­‐
ther   in   a   cultural   theory;   human   rights   discourse   should   be   seen   as   a  
culture.  Consequently,  human  rights  are   to  be   respected  not  because   they  
are  a  universal   set  of   standards  but  because   they  constitute   the  minimum  
common  legal  and  political  standard  agreed  by  the  international  communi-­‐
ty   of   nations   at   a   particular   historical  moment.   It   is   in   this  manner   that  
human  rights  offer  a  pragmatic  ‘tool’  that  helps  us  to  resolve  the  problems  
we   confront—such   as   cruelty,   injustice,   oppression,   neocolonialism   and  
genocide.  
   Rorty’s  attack  on  the  theory  of  human  rights  deserves  consideration  
not   only   because   it   has   been   formulated   at   a   very   critical  moment   in   the  
debates  over  the  universality  or  particularity  of  human  rights,  but  also  be-­‐
cause  it  makes  an  important  contribution  to  undermining  the  universalism  
of  human  rights.  Rorty’s  call  to  put  aside  the  quest  for  metaphysical  founda-­‐
tions  of  human  rights  and  engage   instead  with  the  pragmatic  problems  of  
how  to  relieve  suffering,  builds  on  the  practical  ethos  common  to  the  work  
of  many  human  rights  activists  (Barreto,  2011).  It  is  interesting  to  point  out  
that  subsequent  critiques  of  human  rights  theory  in  recent  years  have  raised  
similar  issues;  although  some  of  these  critiques  have  taken  different  trajec-­‐
tories   than  Rorty’s,   there   is   a   common  position   against   the   universal   and  
metaphysical  framework  of  human  rights.  For  example,  it  has  been  argued  
that:  human  rights  have  become  over  the  years  essentialized  and  universal  
norms  often  expressed  in  juridical  terms,  when  their  history  indicates  that  
human   rights   are   a  Western   concept   grounded   in   liberal   views   and   serve  
the   interests   of  Western   powers   acting   in   neo-­‐colonial   terms   (Baxi,   2007;  
Mutua,  2002;  Spivak,  2004);  or  human  rights  are  vague,  abstract  and  more  
symbolic  than  substantive  (Ignatieff,  2001).  
   Regarding   the   second  move,  Rorty  goes   even   “beyond   the   formula-­‐
tion   of   an   ethics   of   sympathy   and   thinks   of   the   ways   in   which   such   a  
morality  can  be  translated  into  an  ethos  in  the  culture  of  the  new  millenni-­‐
um”   (Barreto,   2011,   p.   1).   For   example,   Rorty   speaks   of   the   importance   of  
campaigns  to  complement  the  shift  in  sensibilities,  the  expanding  ‘we.’  His  
claim  is  that  beyond  animal  pain,  which  may  be  universal,  the  human  suf-­‐
fering   that   concerns  him   is   precisely   tied   to   the   contingency   of   language.  
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Rorty’s  sentimental  education  is  not  simply  about  realizing  that  others  suf-­‐
fer  as  I  do  but  expanding  your  sense  of  the  range  of  human  vulnerabilities.  
As  Barreto  (2011)  adds,  Rorty  develops  the  concept  of  a  ‘global  moral  senti-­‐
ment’   by   focusing   on   sympathy   and   solidarity   as   the   appropriate   feelings  
and  values  for  a  human  rights  culture.  
  
Critique  of  Rorty’s  Model  on  ‘Sentimental  Education’  
     
   Using  Rorty’s  intervention  as  a  point  of  departure  for  thinking  about  
sentimental  education   in  HRE,   I  argue  here  that,  even  though  he  makes  a  
valuable  contribution  by  highlighting  in  particular  the  role  of  sympathy  and  
‘sentimental  education’,   there  are   two  problems  with  his   theory  that   leave  
the   door   open   for   cheap   sentimentality   to   intrude.   These   problems   are:  
first,  by  reducing  justice  to  solidarity  and  psychologizing  solidarity,  he  ne-­‐
glects  material/structural  conditions  of  inequality;  also,  the  fact  that  Rorty’s  
model  casts  the  other  in  the  role  of  the  victim  ultimately  helps  rationalize  
the  structural  inequalities.  The  second  problem  is  that  we  may  cultivate  pity  
rather  than  solidarity,  which  reinscribes  the  power  of  the  self  over  the  oth-­‐
er;  relevant  to  this  problem  is  the  tendency  to  circumscribe  response  to  the  
width  of  the  learner’s  skull  so  that  s/he  fails  to  follow  through  with  action  in  
the  world.   Each   of   these   problems   is   briefly   discussed   below   to   show   the  
dangers   of   uncritical   sentimentality   as   well   as   how   other   scholars   in   the  
field  of  HRE  may  help  us  go  beyond  Rorty’s  account.    
   First,  rather  than  regarding  the  others’  suffering  as  a  politics  of  injus-­‐
tice,  Rorty’s  proposal  focuses  on  the  self  who  needs  to  be  motivated  to  show  
solidarity  towards  the  other  and  thus  fails  to  pay  attention  to  the  politics  of  
the  asymmetry  of  power  between  the  West  and  vulnerable  others.  In  other  
words,  Rorty’s  proposal   fails   to   address   the   causes  of   social   grievance  and  
suffering  (Brown,  2004).  This  critique  highlights  the  failure  to  acknowledge  
the  systemic  (social,  economic,  juridical)  inequalities  and  deficiencies  of  the  
political  system  that  hinder  the  implementation  of  human  rights  in  the  first  
place.  Rorty  restricts  the  efficacy  of  his  sentimental  education  to  our  ability  
to  read  about  and  draw  the  ‘correct’  sympathetic  conclusions  about  others’  
suffering.  He  seems  to  underestimate  the  possibility  that  feelings  of  sympa-­‐
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thy,  when  confined  to  the   individual  or  when  they  are  de-­‐politicized  from  
the   economic   and   political   circumstances,   may   in   fact   reinforce   the   very  
patterns  of  economic  and  political   subordination  responsible   for  such  suf-­‐
fering  (Spelman,  1997).  
In  addition,  Rorty  fails  to  consider  that  the  overvaluation  of  suffering  
entails  another  danger;  that  of  fixing  others  as  the  sufferers-­‐victims,  as  those  
who   can   overcome   their   suffering   only   when   the   rest   of   the   world   feels  
moved  enough  to  empathize  with  their  suffering  (Zembylas,  2013a).  This  is  
precisely  the  difference  between  Rorty’s  proposal  and  postcolonial  theoriza-­‐
tions  of  human  rights   (such  as  Baxi’s,  2007);  empathizing  with   the  other’s  
suffering  does  not  automatically  mean  that  the  trapping  of  turning  the  oth-­‐
er  into  a  passive  and  submissive  victim  is  dismissed.  Failing  to  address  the  
political  conditions  of  those  who  are  marginalized  and  oppressed  and  omit-­‐
ting   to   acknowledge   the   political   necessity   of   improving   their   living  
conditions  limits  HRE  within  the  realm  of  what  Terry  Eagleton  refers  to  as  
the  ‘banality  of  goodness’  (Eagleton,  2009):  a  banal  moral  ethos  grounded  in  
the   self-­‐centered   altruism  of   the   everyday,  while   the   asymmetry   of   power  
that  must   become   the   principle   of   solidarity   upon  which   we   act   towards  
vulnerable  others  remains  unrecognized  (see  also  Chouliaraki,  2011).  
   Second,  Rorty  neglects  to  acknowledge  the  dangers  of  sentimentality  
in  narratives  of  suffering  (Berlant,  1998).  Thus,  there  is  skepticism  about  the  
potential  for  “sad  and  sentimental  stories”  to  impel  privileged  individuals—
who   may   be   distant   spectators   to   human   rights   violations—to   establish  
meaningful   empathetic   connections   with   others   (Hayden,   1999;   Staples,  
2011).   To   echo   Berlant’s   (2000)   acute   critique   of   sentimental   narrative   or  
sentimental  liberalism,  injustice  and  human  rights  violations  cannot  be  re-­‐
duced  to  feeling  bad  about  other’s  pain.  Suffering,  which  is  in  part  an  effect  
of   socio-­‐economic  relations  of  violence  and  poverty,   is  problematically  as-­‐
sumed  to  be  alleviated  by  empathetic  identification  with  others,  yet  there  is  
no   assurance   that   the   feelings   evoked  will   not   be   those   of   pity,   a   feeling  
which  does  not  lead  to  any  action.  Pity  refers  to  a  type  of  affective  relation-­‐
ship   between   the   spectator   and   a   sufferer,   which   shows   empathy   and  
tender-­‐heartedness  towards  the  spectacle  of  human  pain  but  it  is  not  neces-­‐
sarily   accompanied   by   action   to   alleviate   the   structural   conditions   and  
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effects  of  suffering  (Boltanski,  1999;  Cohen,  2001;  Geras,  1999).  The  object  of  
pity   exists   primarily   within   an   imaginary   realm   that   sentimentalizes   the  
other.  Woodward  also  argues  that:    
  
the  experience  of  being  moved  by  these  sentimental  scenes  of  suffer-­‐
ing,  whose   ostensible   purpose   is   to   awaken   us   to   redress   injustice,  
works   instead  to  return  us   to  a  private  world   far   removed   from  the  
public   sphere.  Hence,   in   a   crippling   contradiction   […]   the   result   of  
such  empathetic  identification  is  not  the  impulse  to  action  but  rather  
a  “passive”  posture.  […]  The  genre  of  the  sentimental  narrative  itself  
is  morally  bankrupt.  (2004,  p.  71)  
  
It   is   difficult   to   see   how   Rorty’s   appeal   to   a   “shared   ability   to   feel  
pain”—which  is  curiously  grounded  in  a  universal  claim  when  he  has  made  
great   efforts   to   reject   universalism—prevents   the   danger   of   empty   senti-­‐
mentality.  Rorty’s  proposal  does  not  anticipate  these  implications  and  goes  
only  so  far  as  claiming  that  cultivating  a  greater  awareness  of  and  sensitivity  
to  others’  suffering  will  produce  respect.  As  Hayden  rightly  observes:    
  
Surely   a   sympathetic   familialization   is   valuable   in  helping   to   foster  
respect  for  human  rights;  however,  would  it  necessarily  produce  that  
respect,  and  if  it  does  not,  then  what?  […]  What  about  would-­‐be  vio-­‐
lators  of  human  rights  who  do  not  care   to   read  stories  about   those  
they  would  dominate  and  oppress,  or  who  are  unaffected  by  the  sto-­‐
ries  they  do  read?  Do  we  simply  shake  our  heads  in  disappointment  
at  the  actions  of  torturers,  rapists,  and  genocidal  murderers  and  then  
encourage  them  to  try  reading  some  more  sad  stories  about  their  vic-­‐
tims?  (1999,  p.  63)  
  
   This  critique  highlights  the  trappings  of  narratives  of  sentimentality  
such  as   voyeurism  and  passivity—trappings   that   evoke   superficial   feelings  
of   sympathy   and   pity   for   the   sufferers   rather   than   compassionate   action  
which  can  make  a  difference  in  sufferers’  lives  (Zembylas,  2013a).  In  educa-­‐
tional   literature   more   generally,   there   have   been   concerns   whether  
sentimentality   and   sentimental   education   can   really  make   a   difference   in  
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developing   emotional   connections   among   students   and   others  who   suffer  
from  human  rights  violations  (Callan,  1994;  Zembylas,  2008).  
Finally,  Rorty  does  not  describe  how  the  ability  to  recognize  others’  
suffering  will  necessarily  lead  to  some  kind  of  action  to  eliminate  the  causes  
of   their  suffering.  He  claims  that  solidarity  will  be  created  based  solely  on  
feelings  of  sympathy;  however,  he  does  not  tell  us  how  it  is  that  individual  
empathizers   would   experience   the   ‘right’   kind   of   feelings   such   that   they  
would  be  motivated  to  experience  solidarity  and  thus  strive  to  alleviate  oth-­‐
ers’   suffering   through   specific   actions   which   make   a   difference   (Hayden,  
1999).  Again,  the  consequence  of  this  sort  of  sentimental  education  in  HRE  
is  that  it  does  not  seem  to  encourage  transformative  action  for  the  elimina-­‐
tion  of   the  causes  of  human  rights  violations;   it  only  goes  as   far  as   taking  
action  to  alleviate  suffering.  To  encourage   transformative  action,  as   litera-­‐
ture   on   critical   human   rights   education   (Bajaj,   2011a;   Keet,   2012)   and   the  
transformative  model  of  HRE  (Bajaj,  2011b,  2012;  Tibbitts,  2002)  shows,  hu-­‐
man   rights   educators   need   to   actively   promote   transformation   at   many  
levels   (pedagogical   practice,   policy,   teacher   development),   including   the  
recognition  of   the   role  of   affect   in   the  process  of   transformation   (Amsler,  
2011;  Berlak,  2004;  Boler,  1999;  Stenberg,  2011;  Zembylas,  2013b,  2015).  
   The  problems   identified  here  can  be  a  starting  point   for   further   in-­‐
sights   into   sentimental   education   in   HRE   so   that   sentimentality   is   not  
entirely  dismissed   for  being   too  superficial.  Two   important   issues   that  are  
highlighted  by  the  literature  on  sentimentality  are  the  following:  first,  how  
to  respond  sentimentally  while  not  ignoring  the  material/structural  condi-­‐
tions  of   inequality;  and  second,  how  to  show  solidarity  through  pragmatic  
action  rather   than   falling   into   the   trap  of  pity  or  passive  empathy.  Rorty’s  
attempt  to  re-­‐establish  the  central  role  that  sentimental  education  plays  in  
sympathizing   with   those   who   are   oppressed   by   humiliation,   cruelty   and  
pain   is   a   valuable   point   of   departure   to   reflect   more   critically   on   senti-­‐
mental  education  in  HRE  and  to  enrich  what  is  already  present  in  the  field  
(e.g.  scholarship  carried  out  by  Bajaj,  Tibbitts  and  Keet).  
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Toward  a  Critical  Account  of  Sentimental  Education  in  HRE  
  
   While  it  is  true  that  Rorty’s  proposal  opens  some  possibilities  to  alle-­‐
viate  suffering  by  fostering  feelings  of  sympathy  and  solidity  for  others  who  
suffer,   the   failure   to   acknowledge   the   ‘asymmetry’   between   the   spectator  
and   the   sufferer   is   simultaneously   a   failure   to   realize   that   no  matter   how  
‘sentimental’  HRE  is,  it  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  action  that  aims  to  alle-­‐
viate  the  structural  conditions  and  effects  of  suffering  (Chouliaraki,  2008).  
To   go  beyond   a   sentimental  HRE,   the   first   step   that   is   needed   for  human  
rights   educators   and   learners   is   their   ability   to   trace   the  process   of   senti-­‐
mentalization   of   narratives   of   suffering   and   how   this   process   can   end   up  
being  fixed  into  self-­‐centered  accounts  of  others’  suffering  in  our  globalized  
world.  The  emerging  testimonial  culture  of  personalized  stories  of  suffering  
makes   the  pedagogical   challenges  of  human   rights   educators   and   learners  
even  greater,  because  as  Brown  (1995)  has  shown,  the  fetishization  and  sen-­‐
timentalization   of   narratives   of   suffering   tend   to   turn   all   political   claims  
into  claims  of  emotional   injury,   thus  depoliticizing   the  histories   that  have  
produced   suffering   and   rendering   action   to   alleviate   the   structural   condi-­‐
tions   and   effects   of   suffering   impossible.  What   is   needed,   therefore,   is   a  
pedagogical  orientation  that  is  more  balanced  than  Rorty’s—one  which  can  
offer  critical   ‘sentimental  education’  in  HRE,  inspired  by  the  fertile  ground  
of  sentimentality,  yet  one  that  is  not  restricted  to  a  superficial  engagement  
with  stories  of  human  rights  abuse.    
   A   critical   perspective   is   well   established   in   HRE   literature   (Bajaj,  
2011a;  Keet,  2012;  Tibbitts,  2002)  and  its  contribution  is  invaluable  in  terms  
of   preparing   the   ground   for   HRE   practices   that   critique   superficial   ap-­‐
proaches,   acknowledge   the   role   of   power   relations   and   promote  
transformation.  In  this  paper  I  want  to  build  on  these  contributions  and  go  
a  step  further  by  focusing  in  particular  on  the  critique  of  the  role  of  affect  
and  sentimentality  in  HRE.  What  I  term  here  critical  sentimental  education  
is  that  which  approaches  stories  of  human  rights  abuse  with  both  criticality  
and   affective   engagement,   highlighting   the   importance   of   critical   con-­‐
sciousness  around  issues  of  power  relations  and  various  types  of   injustices  
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and  inspiring  transformative  action  to  dismantle  these  injustices.  A  critical  
sentimental  education  that  seeks  to  help  learners  feel  solidarity,  while  also  
coming  to  understand  the  dangers  of  pity  and  engage  in  some  sort  of  action  
is   no   doubt   a   difficult   undertaking,   especially   in   contemporary   circum-­‐
stances  of  massive  violations  of  human  rights  around  the  world.  Needless  to  
say,  there  are  human  rights  educators  who  try  to  use  human  rights  frame-­‐
work  specifically  to  evoke  the  respect  deserving  those  who  suffer  violations  
and  work  in  solidarity  rather  than  “pity  and  guilt”  approach.  Yet,  what  I  am  
arguing  here   is   the  need   to   specifically   recognize  and  overcome   the  prob-­‐
lems  identified  earlier  in  relation  to  the  manipulation  of  emotions;  for  this  
to  happen,  a  critical  sentimental  orientation  on  HRE  would  need  to  operate  
on  several  levels.  
   First,  a  critical  orientation  to  sentimental  education  is  an  exploration  
that  not  only  recognizes  the  role  of  emotions  and  suffering  in  the  processes  
of  human  rights  assertion  and  recognition,  but  also  it  explicitly  exposes  and  
deconstructs  the  dangers  and  trappings  of  cheap  sentimentality.  Undoubt-­‐
edly,  the  cultivation  of  empathy  and  solidarity  is  regarded  as  an  important  
aspect   of   HRE   (e.g.   see   Al-­‐Daraweesh   &   Snauwaert,   2013),   and   therefore  
“promoting   proper   sentimental   dispositions   will   be   an   important   task”  
(Steutel  &  Spiecker,  2004,  p.  532).  Although  it  is  not  always  clear  what  con-­‐
stitutes   ‘proper’  sentimentality,   it   is   important  not  to  rush  and  discard  the  
value   of   sentimentality   altogether   (Callan,   1994).   The   problem   is   not   the  
value  of  those  emotions  that  can  be  useful  in  our  struggle  to  increase  empa-­‐
thy   with   others’   suffering,   but   the   emotions   that   are   shallow   and   self-­‐
centered  and   inhibit   the  possibilities   that  might  make   these  emotions   the  
point  of  departure   to  recognize  structural  conditions  of   inequality  and   in-­‐
spire  transformative  action.    
   The  value  of   critical  orientation,   then,   lies   in   its   analytical   implica-­‐
tion,   namely   that   to   promote   action-­‐oriented   empathy   and   solidarity   in  
HRE   practice,   there   has   to   be   a   systematic   investigation   of   the   different  
ways   in  which   feelings   of   empathy   are   evoked   in   the   classroom  and  have  
differential   implications   for   those  who   suffer   (Zembylas,   2013a).   If,   for   ex-­‐
ample,  human  rights  educators  and  learners  engage  in  critical  inquiry  that  
demonstrates   how   the   reading   of   stories   of   horrendous   suffering   often  
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moves  us  to  pity  and  ends  up  with  resuming  our  ordinary  life,  then  this  will  
be  an  important  step  forward  to  wonder:  what  more  can  I  (we)  do  to  change  
this?   To   interrogate   the   trappings   of   sentimentality   and   especially   narra-­‐
tives   of   pity,   human   rights   educators   and   learners   need   to   challenge   the  
emotional  investments  and  emotion-­‐informed  ideologies  that  underlie  their  
responses   toward   suffering   and   seek   to   promote   sympathy   and   solidarity  
that  make  a  concrete  difference  in  sufferers’  lives.  I  am  not  suggesting  that  
there  are  no  human  rights  educators  who  actually   try   to  evoke   feelings  of  
sympathy  and  solidarity,  particularly  in  the  non-­‐formal  HRE  sector;  what  I  
am   saying   is   that  human   rights   educators  will   also  need   to   engage   in   the  
hard  work  of  explicitly  challenging  the  emotional  investments  that  underlie  
these  practices.  
   For  example,  an  emotional  ideology  of  sentimental  education  that—
intentionally   or   unintentionally—invests   in   feelings   of   guilt   to   motivate  
sympathy   for   others   is   unlikely   to   establish   pedagogical   opportunities   for  
action-­‐oriented   empathy   against   social   structures   of   injustice.   Feelings   of  
guilt   involve   unconscious   identification   with   the   other—they   are   self-­‐
centered,  apolitical  and  privilege   issues  of  personal   identity  and  difference  
(Zembylas,   2013a).   If   learners  are  bombarded  with  material   teaching   them  
that  they  should  feel  guilty  for  doing  very  little  about  human  rights  abuses,  
then   this   logic  may  bounce  back   and   students  may   adopt   an   angry,   reac-­‐
tionary  approach.  Becoming  angry  at  those  who  try  to  instill  guilt  in  them,  
learners  may  attempt  to  justify  through  their  anger  why  they  have  no  moral  
or   political   commitment   to   act,   and   thus   the   whole   effort   will   become   a  
boomerang  (see  Boltanksi,  1999;  Cohen,  2001).  
   Second,  a  critical  orientation  to  sentimental  education  in  HRE  offers  
an   alternative   vision   of   agency   and   solidarity   for   students,   by   engaging  
them   in   pragmatic   everyday   actions   that   lay   the   seeds   for   systemic   and  
structural  change.  Horton  and  Kraftl  term  these  actions  ‘implicit  activisms’,  
that   is,   actions   which   are   “small-­‐scale,   personal,   quotidian”   and   proceed  
“with  little  fanfare”  (2009,  p.  14).  For  example,  showing  care  for  others  who  
suffer  through  modest  everyday  acts  or  standing  up  for  immigrants  who  are  
discriminated   in  the  public  sphere  through  supportive  words  and  gestures  
constitute  forms  of   implicit  activism.  These  modest  forms  of  activism  may  
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not  leave  much  (representational)  trace  but  extend  the  field  of  activism  and  
solidarity   and   open   more   possibilities   for   schools   to   get   involved   with  
pragmatic  everyday  actions  that  make  a  contribution  to  social  justice  causes  
rather   than   assuming   that   activism   is   only   about   the   grandiose   and   the  
iconic   (Zembylas,   2013b).   These   individual   everyday   acts   seem,   at   first  
glance,  not  to  have  any  dramatic  effects;  however,  collectively  they  are  ac-­‐
tions  of  considerable  emotive  and  political  value,  because  they  contribute  to  
the  process  of  gradual  change;  the  point  is  “not  to  identify  every  daily  act  as  
activist,   but   to   theorize   how   small   acts   transform   social   relations   in  ways  
that  have  the  potential  to  foster  social  change”  (Martin,  Hanson  &  Fontaine,  
2007,  p.  79).  
   Finally,   a   critical   orientation   to   sentimental   education   in  HRE   cre-­‐
ates  pedagogical  openings  for  cultivating  self-­‐empowerment,  solidarity  and  
action-­‐oriented  empathy  with  others.  Learners  are  enabled  to  establish  and  
maintain  this  critical  attentiveness  and  self-­‐empowerment,  when  they  begin  
to  interrogate  and  challenge  arguments  based  on  binaries  such  as  us/them,  
citizen/foreigner,   friends/enemies,  and  good/evil,   a   stereotyping  of  groups  
considered   to   be   more   or   less   grievable.   Research   in   peace   education  
(Bekerman  &  Zembylas,  2012;  Zembylas,  2015)  and  HRE  (Bajaj,  2011b,  2012)  
in  fact  shows  how  widespread  these  binaries  are  and  emphasizes  the  neces-­‐
sity  of  engaging  in  explicitly  showing  their  negative  consequences.  In  terms  
of  pedagogical  practice,  for  example,  this  idea  implies  that  learners  are  en-­‐
couraged   to   ask   questions   and   explore   the   potential   of   actions   that  
challenge  the  taken-­‐for-­‐granted  policy  in  many  countries  of  keeping  asylum  
seekers  in  remote  detention  camps.  These  questions  could  raise  many  con-­‐
cerns   about   human   rights   violations:  Do   asylum   seekers   in   these   settings  
have  human  rights  or  not?  What  are  their  stories?  Does  each  and  every  hu-­‐
man  being  is  viewed  as  an  individual  with  a  history  and  identity  that  require  
dignity  and  respect?  How  far  our  compassionate  empathy  can  go  for  these  
fellow   human   beings?  What   can   be   practically   done   (by   you   and  me)   to  
show   solidarity   to   the   suffering   of   these   fellow   human   beings?   It   is  more  
likely   that   students  will   overcome   the   dangers   of   cheap   sentimentality,   if  
they   begin   to   understand   the   conditions   (structural   inequalities,   poverty,  
globalization  etc.)  that  give  rise  to  suffering  and  acknowledge  the  emotional  
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connections   between   themselves   and   others,   specifically   what   it   might  
mean  for  a  fellow  human  being  to  encounter  these  vulnerabilities.    
   Needless   to   say,   this   is  not  an  easy   task,  especially  when  privileged  
learners  are  inextricably  implicated  in  the  structures  and  systems  (e.g.  capi-­‐
talism)   that   lead   to   so   much   suffering   in   the   world   (Bajaj,   2015).   For  
example,   the   privileged   learners   who   witness   narratives   of   human   rights  
abuses   from  a  distance   (e.g.   in   the   context   of   a   poor   developing   country)  
may   get   the   impression   that   the   situation   is   inalterable   and   inevitable  
(Zembylas,   2013a).   In   a   classroom   that   harbors   pity   rather   than   self-­‐
empowerment   and   action-­‐oriented   empathy,   the   students   will   detach  
themselves  from  the  reality  of  suffering,  suspend  compassionate  action  and  
engage   in   ‘passive  empathy’   (Boler,   1999).  The   recognition  of   the  multiple  
ways   in  which  compassion   is  assigned  differently   in  a  classroom—i.e.  how  
learners   are   taught   to   feel   more   compassion   for   some   individuals   and  
groups   compared   to   others—is   relevant   to   how   learners   engage   with   the  
other’s  suffering.  These  multiple  ways  in  which  compassion  is  assigned  dif-­‐
ferently  need  to  be  exposed  and  interrogated  rather  than  taken  for  granted.  
While   privileged   learners   become   knowledgeable   about   other   people’s  
lives—including  issues  they  have  not  had  to  endure,  such  as  sexual  slavery,  
seeking   asylum,   starvation,   torture,   or   having   a  missile   hit   a  marketplace  
(Porter,  2006)—they  also  become  mindful  of  how  it   is   impossible  to  claim  
that  they  fully  ‘know’  or  ‘feel’  the  other’s  pain  (Zembylas,  2013a).  Attentive-­‐
ness   to   the   ways   in   which   compassion   is   assigned   differently   involves  
cultivating   in   students   the   ability   to   acknowledge   the   symmetries   and  
asymmetries  of  suffering.    
   In   summary,   then,   the  purpose  of   critical   sentimental   education   in  
HRE  is  to  create  those  pedagogical  spaces  so  that  symmetries  and  asymme-­‐
tries   of   suffering   are   not   simply   recognized   to   evoke   certain   feelings   but  
rather   those   feelings   are   interrogated   to   promote   pragmatic   action   for  
transformation  (Bajaj,  2012).  To  fulfill   this  purpose,  we  need  a  pedagogical  
orientation   that  embraces  human  rights   framework  specifically   to  critique  
the  emotional  consequences  of  different  actions.  It  is  not  enough  to  use  the  
human  rights  framework  to  evoke  respect  and  empathy;  human  rights  edu-­‐
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cators   need   to   become   critically   conscious   of   the   role   of   affect   and   senti-­‐




   This  paper  has  suggested  that  an  explicit  analysis  of  different  dimen-­‐
sions   in  critical   sentimental  education  has   the  potential   to  enrich  existing  
scholarship  in  critical  HRE.  The  orientation  sketched  here  focuses  on  how  
HRE  might  move  away  from  an  instrumentalized,  moralized  and  sentimen-­‐
talized   method   for   promoting   solidarity   and   empathy   with   narratives   of  
suffering.  This  orientation  is  not  limited  to  perspectives  such  as  Rorty’s  vo-­‐
yeuristic   approach   to   sentimentality,   but   rather   focuses   explicitly   on   the  
emotional   and   political   consequences   of   various   manifestations   of   senti-­‐
mentality.  Such  an  orientation   in  HRE  will  not  only  encourage   learners  to  
become  more  sympathetic  to  the  living  realities  of  those  who  suffer,  but  it  
will  also  interrogate  the  conditions  of  hearing  narratives  of  suffering  so  that  
possibilities  for  cheap  sentimentality  are  minimized  as  much  as  possible.  If  
human  rights  educators  want  their  students  to  develop  both  an  emotional  
and  a  political  sensibility  that  enables  them  to  understand  stories  of  suffer-­‐
ing  and   their   consequences,   then   the  pedagogical  practices  by  which   they  
attempt  to  achieve  that  aim  might  have   less   to  do  with  human  rights  em-­‐
bedded   in   a   ‘declarationist   framework’   and  more  with   an   interrogation  of  
sentimentality  in  human  rights  assertion  and  recognition.    
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